There is a conceptual distinction: Encryption in transit vs. encryption at rest. You may send the packets encrypted to the server, but if they are not encrypted on the server’s file system, anyone can read them.

The real question is, why do you think governments make such a big fuss about citizens having access to military grade encryption?

There have been audits of e2ee implementations, and the algorithms used also have some objective properties. I don’t think that I have ever heard in cryptography discussions that backdoors are so widespread that the discussion is moot. I have only heard, time and time again, the opposite.

Even Apple, in this very occasion, opted to ditch the service rather than backdoor it, and in fact takes the UK to court over this. I think that the opinion that this is all for show is a tad wild, and not very well supported in this occasion.

Like every cryptology book starts with the adage “There is cryptography that prevents your little sister from reading your mail, and cryptography that prevents the government from reading your mail, and we will talk about the latter.”

https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/02/23/three-questions-about-apple-encryption-and-the-u-k/

On the other hand, not all implementations are created equal. Telegram was recently under fire, and there is a lot of variance in e2ee implementations in XMPP clients, IIRC.

The basic way to do this is you respond to these three questions: What am I trying to protect? From whom? What are they able to do to get there?

Perhaps this explains why all these spook impostors are so vehemently against advanced privacy and anonymity. They are signaling they are the good ones!

This is some Gestapo/Stasi shit.

Like, all queer persons must go beyond Signal/Tor level.

This extends to the physical world: Plan ahead for escape routes and survival networks.

I will come back with this angle but, REMEMBER those mfers who always said “the NSA does not target you, so asking about anything more than Signal is paranoid/futile if ever the NSA targets you”?

REMEMBER that we said that some people have advanced threat models by default? Eg feminist activists, activists in third countries, queer people?

WHO is paranoid now, that being queer, pro-Palestine, and/or climate activists can have you on the watchlist?

This development only proves my previous points that the hordes of sock-puppets spamming the Privacy forum are fucking spooks. Pooping the conversation about advanced privacy and anonymity should qualify for permabans, IMHO.

They don’t even cite the datapoints, my friend. It is a trademark infringement cease-and-desist…

either Signal fans have to donate more or Signal has to start finding other monetization which if we look at other companies means selling private data.

Lo and behold, after RiseUp now Signal is accused of selling data. Well, it is well known (and audited) that Signal keeps so little metadata it is not even useful to the authorities that have subpoeana-ed it.

This is an extra-ordinary claim you have to back with extra-ordinary evidence, in order to save face.

Clean cut kids do not find Lemmy very palatable.

The alternatives were suggested briefly in the segment, not the site. Oliver pointed to the site those people who can’t ditch Meta right now.

it’s going to hurt Meta’s bottom line eventually

Just hurting Meta’s bottom is good enough for me

He only now was able to catch up with all the news with Meta moderation from a month ago. He is only a couple weeks back on air.

Remember “Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption”? You can’t get stuff like this in stores!

sentence I never thought I’d write

🤣 🤣

I think is some in-joke having to do with Facebook moderation. Or his typical goofassery with domain names. Can’t help you there.

Lavabit

Connection to Edward Snowden

Lavabit received media attention in July 2013 when it was revealed that Edward Snowden was using the Lavabit email address Ed_Snowden@lavabit.com to invite human rights lawyers and activists to a press conference during his confinement at Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow.[16] The day after Snowden revealed his identity, the United States federal government served a court order, dated June 10, 2013, and issued under 18 USC 2703(d), a 1994 amendment of the Stored Communications Act, asking for metadata on a customer who was unnamed. Kevin Poulsen of Wired wrote that “the timing and circumstances suggest” that Snowden was this customer.[17] In July 2013 the federal government obtained a search warrant demanding that Lavabit give away the private SSL keys to its service, affecting all Lavabit users.[18] A 2016 redaction error confirmed that Edward Snowden was the target.[2]

source

But what is the status now? Also, I think in the years to come the jurisdiction will also play a role. If the service is in the soil of a country that can subpoeana the encryption keys, then nobody is really safe.

Imagine responding like that to any Lemmy post:

*Proton endorses Trump

*K

*Gaza ceasefire

*I’m baby

*The Right:* The market should be free to decide.

*The Market:* Decides

*The Right*: OUtrAgEOuS

Safer.

Well, they handed out activists’ metadata in the past, for the French authorities. In their position of an e2ee provider who controls both ends as a default, they are in a position where the can fuck people over. This is exactly what Snowden described as someone pointing a gun at you while saying “Relax, I am not gonna use it against you.”

So much for safety.

Ah, and my original point was: it is either safe or unsafe, the word saf_er_ means nothing during a genocide.

It send a chill down my spine nonetheless

The little man does some heavy lifting

Well, then them part of the problem, aren’t they.